Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Chris and Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax
Commission of the State of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R.H. Hansen, Chairman; David L. Wilkinson;Attorney General; Stephen G. Schwendiman; assistant
attorney general; Bryce H. Pettey; attorneys for respondent.
R. La Mar Bishop; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Chris and Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, No. 880188.00 (Utah Supreme
Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2128

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

COU*

IN THE SUPREME COURT
&<*&

pocv

#*•

STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS AND DICK'S LUMBER AND
HARDWARE, a Utah Corporation,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appellant,
vs.
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Case No. 880188

ON APPEAL FROM THE TAX COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

R.H. Hansen, Chairman
Utah State Tax Commission
160 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Stephen G. Schwendiman
Chief, Assistant Attorney General
Bryce H. Pettey
Assistant Attorney General
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
R. La Mar Bishop (0343)
Attorney for Appellant
2040 E. 4800 So., #204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801)272-5858

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS AND DICK'S LUMBER AND
HARDWARE, a Utah Corporation,

]
i

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

i

Case No. 880188

Appellant,
vs.
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,

j

Respondent.

ON APPEAL FROM THE TAX COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

R.H. Hansen, Chairman
Utah State Tax Commission
160 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Stephen G. Schwendiman
Chief, Assistant Attorney General
Bryce H. Pettey
Assistant Attorney General
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
R. La Mar Bishop (0343)
Attorney for Appellant
2040 E. 4800 So., #204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801)272-5858

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I: The Utah State Tax Commission
Correctly Determined The Amount of Penalty
Owed By Petitioner
POINT II: U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 (1953), As
Effective June 15,1986, Was Not So Vague
As To Be Unconstitutional

4

CONCLUSION

9

i

7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:

PAGE

Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Collection
Division of the State Tax Commission of Utah.
Appeal No. 87 0276, Before the Utah State Tax
Commission dec. April 19,1988

1

Concerned Parents of Step Children v. Mitchell.
645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982)

6

Grant v. Utah State Land Bd.. 26 Utah 2d 100,
485 P.2d 1035 (1971)

6

Green River Community College. Dist. No. 10 v.
Higher Ed. Personnell Bd.. 95 Wash. 2d 108,
622 P.2d 826 (1980), adhd. to and mod. 95 Wash.
2d 962, 633 P.2d 1324 (1981)

6

Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co.. 292 U.S. 455 (1934)

5

Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co..
717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986)

6

State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 187 (Utah 1987)

7

State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987)

7

State v. Pilcher. 636 P.2d 470 (Utah 1981)

7

State v. Theobold. 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982)

7

United States v. Shirley. 359 U.S. 255 (1959)

8

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. $59-11 -16 (1953)

6

Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5 (1953)

3, 4, 5

Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1 (1953)

1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9

Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1(3) (1953)

1, 3, 4, 5

Utah Code Ann. §59-15-8 (1953)

5

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1986)

1

OTHER
H.B. No. 135, 46th Leg., Gen Sess., 1986 Utah Laws
ii

5

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter persuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(ii).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the Utah State Tax Commission err in determining the amount of penalty
owed by Petitioner?
2. Did the Utah State Tax Commission err in holding that Utah Code Ann. §5915-5.1 (1953) as effective as of June 15,1986 was not so vague as to be
unconstitutional?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1 (1953).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Utah State Tax Commission
(the Commission) in Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Collection Division of the
State Tax Commission of Utah Appeal No. 87 0276. In this decision the
Commission found that Petitioner had violated U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 due to
Petitioner's negligence and that petitioner was therefore subject to the penalty
provisions of U.C.A. §59-15-5.1(3). Applying the statute to Petitioner's late
payment of taxes, in the amount of $92,874.93, the Commission assessed a
penalty of $9,287.00. The Commission also determined that the wording of §5915-5.1(3) was not unconstitutionally vague.
In this appeal Petitioner admits that it was negligent and that the negligence
resulted in a violation of the statute. Appellants Brief P.2. Petitioner claims
however that the Commission failed to compute the amount of the penalty
correctly and that the statute (§ 59-15-5.1(3)) is unconstitutionally vague and
therefore unenforceable.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1 (1953) requires certain entities to prepay not less
than 90% of the amount of state and local sales tax liability for April and May of
each year. This amount is to be paid to the Tax Commission on the 15th of June.
Prepayment in this context means that instead of the normal July 31 due date for
the remittance of the state and local moneys collected by the merchant, the
merchant must send 90% of those moneys collected in April and May to the State
a few weeks earlier.
In 1986 Petitioner failed to file a return and make a prepayment as required by
the U.C.A. §59-15-5.1. Some thirty eight days later the Petitioner did send in the
required return.
On August 11,1986 Petitioner mailed a request for a waiver of penalties due
to the late filing of its return. By letter dated February 10,1987 Petitioner was
informed that its request was denied.
On or about September 29,1986 the Utah State Tax Commission sent
Petitioner a Notice and Demand for Payment of Taxes. The notice requested
payment of $12,484.95 and was comprised of $11,010.44 in penalty and $1,474.51
in interest.
On March 12, 1987 Petitioner filed a Petition for Redetermination. An informal
hearing was held on May 15,1987, and a written informal decision was issued on
October 5, 1987.
The informal decision found that Petitioner was negligent in its late filing of the
sales tax return and therefore subject to the 10% penalty listed in the statute.
Based on additional information provided by the Petitioner the Commission
determined that the actual amount of the late payment was $92,874.93 (rather than
the $99,000 previously estimated by the Collections Division) and therefore that the
correct amount of penalty was $9,287.00 plus interest. The Commission also
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found that Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1(3) (1953) assessed a flat penalty of 10% of
the amount of tax due, both before and after the 1986 amendment, and that
Petitioner's claim that the penalty, prior to the amendment, was one apportioned
on an annual basis was wrong.
On October 26,1987 Petitioner filed a motion for a formal hearing. This formal
hearing was held on March 9, 1988 and on April 19, 1988 the Commission issued
a final decision affirming the findings and order of the informal hearing.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. The Utah State Tax Commission correctly calculated and assessed the
penalty in this case. The relevant portion of §59-15-5(3) reads "In addition to any
penalties for late payment provided in §59-15-5, there shall be a penalty of 10%
of the total amount of the prepayment due from the date the prepayment return is
due." (emphasis added). The statute provides for a penalty of 10% of the total
amount of the prepayment, due any time after the taxpayer fails to file a complete
timely return. The Commission computed the Petitioner's penalty in the manner
required by the statute.
The Commission's method of calculation is backed by the statutory language
and long and consistent application by the Commission which is the agency
charged by the legislature with administering the statute. Petitioner's method of
calculation is not supported by anything other than Petitioner's desire for a lower
penalty and a strained interpretation of what the legislature meant by changing the
wording of the statute.
Based on the language of the statute, the application of the statute by the
Commission and the rules of statutory interpretation, the Commission calculated
the Petitioner's penalty correctly.
II.

U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 is not so vague as to be unconstitutional. A statute is

not so vague as to be unconstitutional if it is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform

the ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is prohibited. In this
instance the prohibited conduct is the filing of late sales tax returns. Petitioner
knew what conduct was prohibited; and that a penalty would apply; its only
assertion is that it couldn't understand how the penalty was computed.
Even if this Court were to extend the requirement of clarity to encompass not
only what conduct is prohibited but also the penalty for the conduct, the language
in this statute, including the part that imposes the penalty, is clear and the
application of the statute by the Commission consistent with the clear language.
The changes in the statutory language were minor corrections eliminating some
awkwardness in the language of the statute. Awkwardness in statutory language
is not ambiguity.
ARGUMENT
I. THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE
AMOUNT OF PENALTY OWED BY PETITIONER?
Petitioner admits it violated U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 (1953). Petitioner also admits
that violation of this section of the code triggers the penalty provisions located in
§59-15.1(3). Appellants Brief P.2. Petitioner disputes, however, the method used
by the Utah State Tax Commission (the Commission) in calculating the amount of
the penalty.
The relevant portion of §59-15-5(3) reads "In addition to any other penalties
for late payment provided in §59-15-5, there shall be a penalty of 10% of the total
amount of the prepayment due from the date the prepayment return is due."
(emphasis added). The statute provides for a penalty of 10% of the total amount
of the prepayment, due any time after the taxpayer fails to file a complete timely
return.
Petitioner claims the above quoted paragraph really means that the penalty is
10% per annum to be assessed proportionately over the year. However, Petitioner
fails to adequately explain how it arrives at this strained interpretation of the

statutory language. Nowhere in the statute is there any mention of an
apportionment of the penalty over a year or any other period of time. Nor does the
Petitioner quote any precedent for its construction or show where the penalty has
ever been assessed on a per annum basis in the past. In fact Petitioner admits
the statute did not call for a 10% per annum penalty. Appellants Brief P.7.
Petitioner's sole support for its interpretation of §59-15-5.1(3) is the change
made in the statute by H.B. No. 135, which was passed on February 26,1986.
The change made by H.B. No. 135 relevant to this case was the striking of the last
part of the sentence in §59-15-5.1(3) which read "from the date the prepayment
return is due." Petitioner claims the change was made in order to make this
section of the code "consistent with other tax statutes which require a flat penalty
instead of an apportioned penalty." Appellants Brief P.4.
There are two major flaws in Petitioner's argument. First, the Petitioner
presumes that the statute was inconsistent with other statutes providing penalties.
To the contrary, the statutory language was similar to that in §59-15-8 (1953)
which provided for penalties for failure to file sales tax returns in situations other
than that covered in §59-15-5. Additionally the penalty was consistently applied
as a flat penalty rather than an apportioned one both before and after the
amendments of the statute. There being no inconsistency, Petitioner's
interpretation of the purpose of the statutory amendments is clearly wrong.
The second major flaw in Petitioners argument is the presumption that a
change in language is an indication of a change in the law. In Helverina v. New
York Trust Co.. 292 U.S. 455 (1934), the United States Supreme Court held that a
"mere change of language does not necessarily indicate intention to change the
law...". In the current case the changes in language only reaffirmed the position
that was already clearly established through both the plain language of the statute
and the consistent application by the Commission.

This Court has held "Where language of statute indicates legislative intention to
commit broad discretion to agency to effectuate purposes of legislative scheme,
Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment for that of agency as long as
agency's interpretation has warrant in record and reasonable basis in law."
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co.. 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). See also
Concerned Parents of Step Children v. Mitchell. 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982). This is
clearly such a case.
The Legislature has granted the Commission broad powers in administering the
State's tax statutes and the Commission's interpretation in this case follows both
the clear language of the statute and the intent of the Legislature as demonstrated
through its retention of the Commission's interpretation in the wording of the
statute after its amendment. Indeed the amendment of the statute strengthens
the Commission's construction rather than weakens it. Green River Community
College. Dist. No. 10 v. Higher Ed. Personnel Bd.. 95 Wash. 2d 108, 622 P.2d 826
(1980), aff'd. and mod., 95 Wash. 2d 962, 633 P.2d 1324 (1981).
To accept Petitioner's interpretation of the statute, this Court would be forced
to add the words "per annum" to the passage. Essentially, Petitioner is claiming
that instead of a penalty of 10% , the statute requires interest of 10% on top of
the interest already owed under §59-11-16 (1953). If the Legislature had intended
to assess additional interest they would have done so. Instead they assessed a
penalty which by common usage and application of the Commission is different
from interest. "Foundational rules require that the Supreme Court assume that
each term of a statute was used advisedly and that each should be given
interpretation and application in accord with their usually accepted meaning, unless
context otherwise requires." Grant v. Utah State Land Bd.. 26 Utah 2d 100, 485
P.2d 1035 (1971). To accept Petitioner's interpretation would be to violate the
"foundational rules" in Grant by changing the clear meaning of the words through
the addition of unintended terms.

The clear language of the statute, the long-standing construction of the statute
by the Commission and the lack of any contrary authoritative constructions of the
statute confirm that the Commission's computation of the penalty amount
($9,287.00 plus interest) is correct.
II. U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 (1953) AS EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1986, WAS NOT SO
VAGUE AS TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioner claims that "a statute is vague when it is insufficiently explicit and
clear to inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what the penalty for its
breach is." Appellants Brief P.6. Petitioner further claims that §59-15-5.1 is
vague, citing for authority for assertion that (a) Petitioner could not determine its
penalty from the statute, (b) the Legislature changed the statute's language and (c)
the Commission calculated three different sums while determining the proper
amount of the penalty. Ibid. P.7. Based on these claims, Petitioner seeks to have
this Court declare the statute as it was in effect on June 15,1986 null and void.
In response to Petitioner's first claim, the cited authority does not state what
Petitioner claims it does. Petitioner cites State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502 (Utah
1987) for the purpose of showing that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if the
ordinary reader cannot tell what the penalty is. The actual language in the case
reads "whether the statute is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the ordinary
reader of common intelligence what conduct is prohibited." Hoffman at 505. Citing
State v. Pilcher. 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). The actual
language in Hoffman does not mention anything about penalties; rather, it follows
the reasoning of this Court in State v. Theoboid. 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982). "In State
v. Theoboid we held that 'a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited." State
v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).
Petitioner knew what conduct- the late filing of its sales tax return and
prepayment- was prohibited, and therefore the statute is not unconstitutionally

vague according to this Court's previous definitions. However, even if this Court
were to determine that the a statute is unconstitutionally vague if the ordinary
reader cannot determine what the penalty is, in this case the plain and clear
language of the statute makes it clear that the penalty for breach of the statute is
a monetary penalty and that the penalty is a flat 10% of the amount that was
owed.
Petitioner's second claim is that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because
the legislature made changes in the statutory language. In revising the relevant
parts of the statute, the Legislature made only minor changes. The changes made
by the Legislature had no effect on the construction placed on the statute by the
Commission or on the Commission's application of the statute. The only practical
effect of the changes was to relieve some of the awkwardness in the statute's
language and thereby improve its readability. In United States v. Shirley. 359 U.S.
255 (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court found that "awkwardness in statutory
language is not ambiguity". In Shirley the Court was faced with determining the
meaning of the term "person" within a federal statute. The Court determined that
the fact "person" can have different meanings does not make it vague where the
intent of the legislature is clear. The statute at question in this case, §59-15-1 (3)
as effective on June 15,1986 was awkward, but it was not vague, and the intent
of the legislature, as affirmed in their amendment, was that the penalty be applied
as a flat penalty of 10% of the amount owed.
Petitioner's final argument is the statute is vague because the Commission
assessed three different penalty amounts. Petitioner claims that the first amount
assessed was $9,900.00 on or about October 8,1986, followed by a penalty of
$11,010.44 on October 13,1986, and finally a penalty of $9,287.00 on October 5,
1987. The actual order was $11,010.44 on September 29,1986 (see Appellants
Brief Exhibit A) followed by the $9,900.00, and finally the $9,287.00 on the dates
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listed above. The first two penalty calculations were based on estimates by the
Commission of the amount owed by the taxpayer, while the final correct figure was
based on the actual figure as finally determined from information provided by the
taxpayer.
The Commission had no difficulty in determining the amount of the penalty. It
was always assessed as 10% of the tax due which had not been paid at the time
the return was due. The reason for the different figures was simply the result of
better information becoming available, allowing the Commission to more accurately
assess the penalty. The final figure ($9,287.00), having been calculated using
actual, not estimated, data, is the correct figure. As for Petitioner's complaint that
none of the figures match the number calculated by the Petitioner, that is simply
because the Petitioner used an annualized apportionment formula which has no
valid application for computing the penalty under this statute.
The statute's meaning and intent were clear to an ordinary reader. Petitioner
owes a penalty based on its breach of the statute, and that penalty is a flat 10%
of the amount of the prepayment which was owed. Petitioner understood the
statute and the fact that its breach would result in a penalty. Therefore, §59-155.1 is not unconstitutionally vague and Petitioner's request that the statute be
declared null and void must be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent respectfully requests that the
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission be affirmed and that Petitioner be
ordered to pay in full the penalty of $9,287.00 plus accrued interest.
DATED this 26th day of August, 1988.
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BRYCJ^T PETTEY
J
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
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